Meta ad account, Aug 16–19 2026 · Shopify product sales by medium & attribution type, same window · prepared for the CEO
Paid social influenced $14,725 of revenue and cleared $2,919 of contribution after media — $4.19 back for every dollar spent. And if you throw away every assisted order and count only the ones where social took the final click, it still cleared $1,282.
That second number is the point of this report, and it is the only thing last click is good for. It is the floor — the worst-case, deliberately unfair reading in which every ad that opened a customer's consideration gets zero credit unless it also closed them. Even there, the week is profitable at 2.4× break-even. The profit is not in question. What is in question is how much of it we are choosing to see.
Everything above the floor is the actual job. Meta is a demand-creation channel — it interrupts people who were not shopping and puts BTO in front of them. Judging it on last click is judging a channel on the one thing it is structurally worst at, and it is the reason prospecting budgets get cut in exactly the weeks they are working hardest.
Paid social touched $14,725. It closed $8,495. The difference — $6,230 — is not a rounding artefact or a measurement error. It is the work Meta is bought to do.
Why last click understates a social channel specifically. Someone scrolling Instagram is not shopping. They see a Bell Moto-10 at 40% off, register it, and come back two days later through a Google search for the model name or by typing btosports.com. Google gets the click; social created the demand. On a last-click scorecard the ad that made the sale happen reads as a wasted impression, and the search campaign that harvested it looks like a genius.
The same logic runs the other way for Meta's own 37.1×. That figure counts anyone who merely saw the ad within a day, and measures against the pre-return value at the pixel. It is the platform marking its own homework and it should not leave the ad account. Any-click is the honest middle: an order Shopify can actually point to, where a paid-social click sits somewhere in the path.
| Reading | Gross | Total sales | Items / purchases | ROAS on total sales | × break-even, gross basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Any click (revenue influenced — the working number) | $14,102 | $14,725 | 125 items | 16.09× | 4.2× |
| Last click (the floor) | $8,098 | $8,495 | 74 items | 9.28× | 2.4× |
| First click | $7,697 | $7,958 | 71 items | 8.70× | 2.3× |
| Meta-reported | — | $33,922 | 127 purchases | 37.07× | n/a |
Total sales is gross less discounts and returns, plus shipping and tax, for utm_medium = paidsocial. The break-even multiple is computed on gross, because the clearable rates it derives from are defined against gross. Meta's figure is Website purchases conversion value summed across all ads; it has no gross equivalent in this dataset.
Applying BTO's own measured return rates and cost structure by category, this week's mix clears 27.2%. Run it on the revenue paid social influenced and on the revenue it closed, and both land well above zero. The floor is the proof; the ceiling is the ask.
Now the same walk-down on the floor. Same cost model, same categories, same axis — only the revenue definition is tightened to orders where paid social took the final click. This is the sanity check, not the scorecard.
This is not a new margin assumption. It is the same category-level model already in the profit diagnostic — measured return rates from BTO's own Shopify data, markup held flat at 40%, with freight, processing, return handling and markdown recovery as stated estimates. Applied to this week's actual product mix rather than a catalogue average.
Returns are priced in, not ignored. The clearable rate is applied to gross revenue and already carries each category's own return rate, so the $333 of returns visible in the window is not double-counted — and the returns still to come on these four days' orders are already accounted for. Returns land weeks after the click; a four-day report showing only booked returns would flatter itself badly.
The honest sentence for the board: "Four days of paid social cleared between $1,282 and $2,919 of contribution on $915 of media. The lower figure assumes every assisted order would have happened anyway."
| Line | Any click — influenced | Last click — floor |
|---|---|---|
| Gross revenue, paid social | $14,102 | $8,098 |
| Less COGS, returns, freight, processing, handling | −$10,268 | −$5,900 |
| Clearable contribution (27.2% / 27.1%) | $3,834 | $2,198 |
| Less media | −$915 | −$915 |
| Contribution after media | +$2,919 | +$1,282 |
| Return per media dollar | $4.19 | $2.40 |
| Efficiency headroom before break-even | 76% | 58% |
Helmets and boots are 68% of the week's influenced revenue — and they are the two categories that clear the least, because they carry the highest return rates in the catalogue.
This is the whole markup-versus-contribution argument showing up in a single week. Helmets influenced $6,957 of gross — half the week — at a 25.6% clearable rate and a 3.91 break-even ROAS. Goggles, gloves and consumables clear 28–32% and break even below 3.30. The blended break-even lands at 3.68 precisely because the mix is helmet-heavy.
It is not a reason to sell fewer helmets this week. They cleared comfortably. It is the reason the same headline ROAS means different things in different weeks, and the reason a mix shift toward goggles, apparel and consumables would raise contribution without raising spend.
Note where the assist layer is heaviest. Pants went from $794 closed to $1,767 influenced and jerseys from $324 to $641 — apparel roughly doubles once assists are counted, because it is what goes in the basket after social put the helmet in someone's head. On a last-click scorecard, apparel looks like a category paid social barely touches.
| Category | Gross influenced | Share | Items | Clears | Contribution | BE ROAS | Gross, last click |
|---|
ASC's influenced revenue is +107% over what it closed. It is doing the top-funnel job, and last click barely credits it.
ASC spent $506 and closed $3,788 — 7.5×, the weaker-looking campaign. But it influenced $7,859, more than Flash, and $3,672 of that carried no last-click credit at all. Flash spent $409 and closed $4,707 — 11.5× — because it is converting demand ASC created. Cut ASC on its last-click number and Flash's conversion rate falls a week later. This is the single most expensive mistake available in this account.
CPM $6.06. Landing-page view rate 83%. Frequency 1.0–2.2 across delivering ads.
151,010 impressions and 4,804 link clicks for $915. 83% of clicks became landing-page views — the site is not losing people on load. Both catalogue ads carry Meta's "Above average" quality, engagement and conversion-rate rankings. Low frequency is the important one: at 1.0–2.2 the audience is nowhere near saturated, which is what makes the scale case below real rather than theoretical.
UGC took 22% of the budget and produced 30% of Meta-attributed value. The catalogue feeds took 43% of spend and did the volume. Neither is redundant — and UGC is the half that creates demand rather than harvesting it.
UGC is the efficiency lever; the catalogue is the volume engine. ASC_Gear_Catalog alone took a third of the entire budget ($304) and drove 41 purchases at a $7.42 cost per purchase — that ad is the account's workhorse and it is not close. But per dollar, UGC returned roughly 1.7× the catalogue's rate, and it is the only creative type that can be manufactured on demand. A catalogue feed can only sell to someone already in market; a UGC video puts someone in market.
The video read supports it. UGC_Flash_Sale_Bell_Moto10_40%_FH held 24.3% three-second play rate and carried 282 viewers to 95% — 12.6% of everyone who started it finished it. Sale_UGC_Youth_Bell_Moto9_FH hooked 33.3%. These are the assets to reproduce.
| Creative type | Spend | Share | Meta value | Share | Purchases | Meta ROAS |
|---|
Meta's ROAS is scaled down by the account's own 0.43 calibration factor — the ratio of influenced Shopify revenue to Meta-reported value — and set against each category's real break-even. Six ads, $144 of spend, are underwater even on the generous reading.
These six fail on every measure — floor, influenced and platform alike, which is what makes them safe to act on without an attribution argument. $143.64 — 15.7% of the week's budget — produced about $58 of contribution against $144 of cost. A net drag of roughly $86 over four days, about $7,800 a year if left running. Redeployed at the account's own average it would have produced closer to $345, so the real cost of leaving it alone is the $287 gap, not the $86 loss.
The biggest single offender is Sidi_X-Power_Boots_50%_v1 at $93.56 — the second-largest spend in the account. It generated 13,131 impressions and 319 link clicks but only three purchases, at a 2.43% CTR and a 0.94% click-to-purchase rate against the account's 2.64%. The creative is getting clicks; the page is not closing them. Worth checking size availability on that SKU before killing the ad — it is the exact signature of the depleted-size problem already documented in the Channable work.
| Ad | Category | Spend | Meta ROAS | Calibrated (any click) | Calibrated (last click) | BE | Verdict |
|---|
Ranked by revenue paid social influenced. Two of the top ten got zero last-click credit — on a strict scorecard they are products social apparently had nothing to do with.
| Product | Type | Influenced | Closed | Assist uplift | Units |
|---|
Bell Moto-10 Fasthouse Raven leads at $2,821 influenced against $1,166 closed — the single most assisted product of the week, and the subject of the account's best-performing video. Alpinestars Tech 7 Boots ($530) and the Fox Proframe MTB helmet ($428) sold with a paid-social click in the path and zero last-click credit — $958 of revenue a last-click report files under "not social."
Order Protection was attached 28 times across influenced orders — the only order-count signal in this dataset. It is opt-in, so it sets a floor rather than a count: at least 28 distinct orders had a paid-social click somewhere in the path.
Efficiency can degrade 76% on the working number, or 58% on the floor, before this week's spend stops clearing. That is the room available, and it argues for stepping up — carefully.